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Despite the importance of theory of mind (ToM) for typical development, there remain two 
key issues affecting our ability to draw robust conclusions. One is the continued focus on 
false-belief as the sole measure of ToM. The second is the lack of empirically validated 
measures of ToM as a broad construct. Our key aim was to examine the validity and 
reliability of the five-item ToM scale (Peterson, Wellman, & Lui, 2005). In particular, we 
extended on previous research of this scale by assessing its scalability and validity for use 
with children from two years of age. Sixty-eight typically developing children (aged 24 to 61 
months) were assessed on the scale’s five tasks, along with a sixth Sally-Anne false-belief 
task. Our data replicated the scalability of the five tasks for a Rasch- but not Guttman-scale. 
Guttman analysis showed a four-item scale may be more suitable for this age range. Further, 
the tasks showed good internal consistency and validity for use with children as young as two 
years of age. Overall, the measure provides a valid and reliable tool for the assessment of 
ToM, and in particular the longitudinal assessment of this ability as a construct.  
 
Theory of mind, toddlers, scale, validity 
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The past decade has seen a plethora of research assessing individuals’ abilities to 
interpret the mental states of others, referred to as theory of mind (ToM). This construct 
represents an individual’s ability to not only understand the perspective of others, but to 
interpret how this perspective may influence the person’s behaviour. Literature on ToM 
ability has had a large impact in the fields of both developmental psychology and 
psychopathology. In particular, the extensive literature on ToM in late pre-school and early 
school years has consistently shown its importance for typical social development (Hughes & 
Leekam, 2004), including associations with peer rejection (Devine & Hughes, 2012), indirect 
aggression (Renouf et al., 2010), and prosocial behaviour (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & 
Banerjee, 2012). Perhaps most notably, ToM is also considered a key cognitive deficit in 
individuals with autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000).  
Despite the importance of ToM for typical development, there remain two key 
limitations that affect our ability to draw robust conclusions on the developmental role of this 
construct. First, there is a lack of evidence regarding the validity and reliability of ToM 
measures, with some studies showing widely used ToM tasks have quite poor psychometric 
properties (Mayes, Klin, Tercyak, Cicchetti, & Cohen, 1996).  The second concern is the 
literature’s continued focus on false-belief ability as the sole measure of ToM (for similar 
critique see Burack, Charman, Yirmiya, & Zelazo, 2001). This focus contrasts with 
knowledge that ToM encompasses a range of abilities that begin to develop long before false-
belief understanding (Wellmann, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Thus, the focus on a single ToM 
skill not only impedes our ability to understand ToM prior to four years of age, but also does 
not allow for the longitudinal assessment of ToM development. Although some measures 
have aimed to address the paucity of knowledge on early theory of mind, including 
measuring the gaze patterns of infants in a violation of expectation paradigm; Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005) and parent report on toddler’s theory of mind abilities (theory of mind 
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inventory; TOMI; Hutchins, Prelock & Bonazinga, 2011), there remains a paucity of research 
on how children’s explicit theory of mind may be directly assessed.  
In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive ToM assessment, Wellman and Liu 
(2004) proposed a ToM scale, consisting of five tasks designed to assess first-order ToM 
abilities. The abilities measured were proposed to progress in difficulty and, as such, develop 
in a progression across early childhood. Wellman and Liu proposed that a single score 
calculated from the scale could be used to index ToM ability.  That is, from a given ability 
level it could be presumed all lower items had been answered correctly and all higher (more 
difficult) items were answered incorrectly. The authors’ original analysis of 75 typically 
developing children showed 80% of respondents (aged 3.5 years to 6 years of age) provided 
response patterns where this index score (highest item scored correct) did indeed accurately 
reflect their performance. The usefulness of this task has been further demonstrated with both 
typically- and atypically-developing children across numerous age ranges from three up to 
thirteen years old (Peterson, et al., 2005; Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012; Shahaeian, 
Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). 
Despite the scale’s promise, some important questions remain regarding both its 
practical application and psychometric properties. To address these questions this study had 
three aims. First, the scale is proposed to provide a measure which assesses ToM skills that 
precede false-belief understanding. However, there is no evidence for the usability of the 
scale with children under 36 months of age, with the majority of research focussed on 
children over 42 months of age (when we would expect false-belief ability to emerge). As 
such, the first aims of this research was to assess the usability and scalability of the five items 
with children from two years of age. Our third aim was to assess the validity of this test 
against a standard false-belief task (the Sally-Anne paradigm). Through the assessment of 
this scale with a younger age range, we have provided information on the usability of this 
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scale as a single comprehensive test of early theory of mind, paving the way for its use as a 
longitudinal measure. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 This study received ethical approval from the Flinders University Social and 
Behavioural Research Ethics Committee and the local Department of Education and Child 
Services (DECS) ethics committee. Information sheets were sent to parents at two local 
childcare centres and two local kindergartens. Parents were required to provide consent for 
the child’s participation in the study. Participants were excluded if there was a suspected or 
known developmental delay. Parental consent was provided for 70 children. Of these 
children, two were unable to participate due to one child being ill and the second receiving a 
diagnosis of Autistic Disorder during the assessment period. The 68 remaining children (boys 
= 41, girls = 27) were aged between 24 and 61 months (M = 44.81, SD = 10.82). Of these 
children 19 were between 2 years 0 months and 2 years 11 months, 19 were between 3 years 
0 months and 9 years 11 months, while 30 were between 4 years 0 months and 5 years 0 
months of age (with majority under 4.5 years old).  All children participated in individual 
cognitive assessments in a quiet area of their childcare centre or kindergarten. All tasks were 
administered on a small table by the primary researcher. When at the table the researcher sat 
directly opposite the child and to maintain motivation each child received a sticker following 
their participation in each task. No child indicated they wished to cease participation in the 
tasks, which were all play-like in nature and as such, all tasks were completed in one sitting 
for all participants.
1
 
                                                          
1
 During the recruitment period the researcher spent some time building rapport (albeit superficial) with the 
children. This did not specifically target participating children but rather involved the researcher being 
present for common group activities such as ‘group-time’ and lunch time. This ensured that the researcher 
was a ‘familiar face’ to the children in the centres, so the participating children were comfortable to leave 
the group to participate in the cognitive assessment.  
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Tasks and Scoring 
Two separate measures were administered. One was the widely used single-item 
Sally-Anne false-belief task (see Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and the other was the 
Australian adaptation of the five-item ToM scale (Peterson, et al., 2005). It is understood that 
this task is suitable for less verbal children and uses vocabulary with which Australian 
children are more familiar (e.g., ‘biscuit’ instead of ‘cookie’). The scale’s five tasks were: (1) 
Diverse Desires (understanding another’s likes may differ from your own), (2) Diverse 
Beliefs (understanding another person may think differently about the same situation), (3) 
Knowledge Access (ability to judge another’s knowledge of a scenario), (4) False Belief 
(judging another’s false-belief about the content of a descriptive box), and (5) Hidden 
Emotion (understanding a person’s facial expression does not always match their emotion; 
see Wellman & Liu, (2004)). For all children the scale’s items were delivered from easiest to 
most difficult. 
Tasks from the ToM scale were administered and scored as they were by Peterson and 
colleagues (2005). For a more detailed description of the procedures replicated by this study 
see Peterson, et al., 2005. Briefly, each task comprised a control question and a focal 
question. The purpose of the control question was to assess the child’s understanding of the 
scenario presented, while the focal question assessed theory of mind. As with previous use of 
the scale (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004), for the child to receive a score of correct for the task, 
they were required to first respond correctly to the control question.  
All task responses (to both the control and focal questions) were coded as either 
correct (1) or incorrect (0). For tasks one through four, children were able to respond verbally 
(requiring a single-word unambiguous response, such as ‘biscuit’) or by pointing to a picture 
(see Peterson et al., 2005). Task 5 included an additional justification component, where the 
child was required to give a brief explanation for their response. Responses to the 
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justification component of the Hidden Emotion task were recorded verbatim for later coding. 
An independent rater coded Hidden Emotion responses for the entire sample, with 100% 
interrater agreement.  
Results 
 Our primary aim was to assess the validity and scalability of the five-item ToM scale 
for use with children from two years of age. Thus, we first examined the descriptive statistics 
to determine if the tasks were actually comprehensible to our younger age range (see Table 
1). Children demonstrated comprehension of the control question for each of the first three 
tasks (Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs and Knowledge Access) by around two years of age. 
Indeed, the entire sample was able to correctly respond to the control question presented with 
task 1. There was also evidence of children demonstrating an understanding of diverse desires 
and diverse beliefs ToM abilities from just after two years of age.
2
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
 
Scale Analyses 
We assessed the scalability of the tasks to determine the best index (i.e., highest item 
correct or total items correct) of ToM performance. To replicate the analyses used by Peterson 
and colleagues (2005) scalability was assessed using Guttman (Green, 1956) and Rasch 
(Rasch, 1960) scale analyses. There are six patterns of responses consistent with scalable 
performance on the five items (see Table 2). These patterns reflect the key requirement of a 
scalable measure – specifically, that from a person’s ability level all higher tasks should be 
                                                          
2
 A gender difference was only evident on task 3 (Knowledge Access). After controlling for age, compared to 
those children who passed this task, failing the task was predictive of being a boy, Wald(1) = 6.29, p = .01, B 
= -1.89, SE = .76. 
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incorrect and all lower tasks correct. Seventy-two per cent of the children in our sample 
responded in a pattern that mapped onto one of the six ordered patterns. Table 2 shows the 
percentage of children whose responses fit each possible pattern. The ‘other’ category in 
Table 2 represents response patterns that did not fit one of the scalable patterns.  
Insert Table 2 here 
 Of those children whose responses did not fit an exact scalable pattern, 74% (n = 14) 
gave an incorrect response followed by a correct response on the next highest item. This 
discrepancy did not appear to occur consistently for any specific item. The remaining five 
children (26%) from the ‘other’ category, received incorrect scores on two items below their 
highest success.   
 Guttman analysis. A Guttman scale is a type of scale where items can be 
ranked in an order, so that individual’s response patterns to the scale’s items can be 
ascertained by a single score. More specifically, a Guttman scale is a deterministic scale and 
as such is based on the assumptions that: (a) all items lower than an individual’s ability level 
were scored correctly, and (b) all items higher than the individual’s ability level were scored 
incorrect. Green (1956) outlined two key statistics required to assess whether a series of tasks 
fit a scalable pattern. First, the coefficient of reproducibility represents the proportion of 
original responses which could be reproduced from the single item index, and must be over 
.90 for items to be considered scalable. Second, the coefficient of consistency indexes the 
extent to which observed scalability was greater than what is expected by chance alone, and 
must exceed .50 to be considered significant. The proposed five-item scale failed to meet 
criteria for a Guttman scale (index of reproducibility = .93, index of consistency = .41). 
However, a four-item scale (removing the most difficult ‘Hidden Emotions’ task) met criteria 
(index of reproducibility = .96, index of consistency = .60). As such, in a younger sample, a 
four-item rather than five-item scale provides a deterministic measure of ToM development.  
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT: Psychological Assessment (2014) 9 
 
Rasch analysis. A Rasch scale is probabilistic and, as such, is based on the 
assumption that from a person’s given ability level, the individual probably responded 
incorrectly to all higher items, and probably scored correctly for all lower items. Data was 
analysed using the WINSTEP computer program (Linacre, 2005). Consistent with the 
methodology of Peterson and colleagues (2005), the item measures were rescaled to give the 
False Belief task an arbitrary item difficulty measure score of 5.0 on the scale. From this 
analysis we examined both infit and outfit statistics for both item and person. Item fit 
statistics assess how well each item fit within the scale. The standardised infit statistic is more 
sensitive to responses that do not fit the pattern near a person’s ability level (e.g., an incorrect 
score at a lower level than their ability). The outfit statistic is more sensitive to unexpected 
responses that are further away from the person’s measurement level (e.g., an incorrect 
response to the easiest task and a correct response to the more difficult task). Both statistics 
have an expected value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Fit values of greater than 2.0 
indicate the item is a misfit (Wright & Masters, 1982) and thus, does not fit with the proposed 
scale. A fit value of greater than -2.0 indicates overfit and thus suggests the scale is more 
deterministic than predicted by the Rasch model (making it a better fit for a Guttman scale). 
For the overall sample all item fit statistics met criteria, including the mean item fit for the 
overall scale (see Table 3), indicating the five tasks did indeed form an acceptable Rasch 
scale. Under a Rasch scale, but not a Guttman scale, one would expect some responses to 
meet the ‘other’ category (see Table 2), given the scale is probabilistic, rather than 
deterministic, in nature.  
Similarly, for person fit statistics, a fit value of greater than 2 means the child’s 
response pattern did not adequately fit with a probabilistic model. Only one child’s fit statistic 
showed a pattern of responses that did not fit the statistical model, with a standard infit of 2.0. 
All other person infit and outfit statistics met criteria for a Rasch model, with an average infit 
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of -.1 (SD = 1.1) and average outfit of 0.0 (SD = .7; see Table 3). That is, the response pattern 
provided by all individuals except one was considered an adequate fit for the Rasch model. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 Rasch analysis also produces item measure statistics that index the difficulty of each 
item (see Table 3). This analysis showed that the order of observed difficulty matched the 
rank order of difficulty expected by the scale’s authors (Peterson, et al., 2005; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004). However, the measure statistics of the two most difficult tasks (False Belief and 
Hidden Emotion) appear comparable in difficulty, suggesting why criteria was not met for the 
five-item Guttman scale. Specifically, the two tasks differed in difficulty by only 0.12, less 
than half the standard errors of the estimates (0.28 and 0.29). The close difficulty level of 
these two tasks was also confirmed by the similar number of children who were able to pass 
the tasks (see Table 1). 
The close measure scores of the two highest items may be due to a floor effect created 
by the inclusion of the younger sample (i.e., 2 – 3 year olds) who all failed both tasks. Thus, 
we also performed linear mixed model analyses to test the idea that the difficulty level of the 
tasks changed with age. We created a logistic mixed-effects model
3
 with task outcome 
(passed or failed) as the dependent variable. Participant ID and item number were added as 
random effects (random effects ID SD = .52; item number SD = 1.64). Not surprisingly, the 
addition of age as a fixed effect significantly improved the fit of the model, χ2(1) = 55.71, p = 
.001, indicating the likelihood of a child passing the task increased as age increased (b = .13, 
SEb = .02). However, allowing slopes to vary by participant did not improve the fit of the 
model χ2(2) = 0.76, p = .68. Therefore, there was no evidence of a difference in the difficulty 
trajectory of the items for the younger or older children in our age range; meaning the similar 
                                                          
3
 All mixed-effects models were created using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011)  in R, an 
open-source language and environment for statistical computing (R Development Core Team, 2011).   
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difficulty levels of the highest two tasks were not due to the inclusion of the younger age 
range. However, we cannot rule out that the similar levels of task difficulty for the two 
hardest tasks may be due to our sample on the whole being younger than samples previously 
used by the scale’s authors (e.g., with children up to 12 years old; Peterson, et al., 2012). 
In sum, item fit statistics demonstrated good internal consistency between the five 
tasks, with all tasks fitting the Rasch model. These results, along with evidence of most 
children being able to pass the control questions on the easier tasks, provide support for the 
suitability and usability of this scale with this younger age range. While there was evidence 
of the two highest tasks being equivalent in difficulty, this was not a result of the inclusion of 
toddlers, but may have been due to the overall younger sample. Regardless, further analysis 
of the Guttman scale showed a four-item scale (excluding Hidden Emotion) was perhaps 
more appropriate for use with toddlers. 
Convergent Validation 
The Sally-Anne false-belief task is often considered the standard assessment of ToM 
(Bloom & German, 2000). Thus, performance on this task was used to assess the convergent 
validity of the ToM scale. Convergent validity was assessed by correlating the total number 
of tasks scored correct4 with performance on the Sally-Anne task. A strong correlation (r = 
.67, p < .001) showed good convergent validity. As the total number of tasks scored correct 
increased, so did the likelihood of passing the Sally-Anne task. Thus, the ToM scale provides 
a score (total items correct) that strongly reflects performance on an already established ToM 
measure. However, the 45% of shared variance between the two measures clearly 
demonstrates that the measures are not redundant.  
 
                                                          
4
 Rasch person measure scores were not used as they correlated with the total items correct at a level of r = .97 (p < .001). 
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Discussion 
ToM is a key cognitive construct required for typical social development. We argued 
two key issues limit the ability to draw robust conclusions on ToM development (particularly 
in the pre-school years). The first was the paucity of empirical evidence on the psychometric 
properties of ToM measures, and the second was the use in most research of a false-belief 
task as the single indicator of ToM ability. Our results provide the first demonstration that the 
five-item ToM scale (Peterson, et al., 2005) is suitable for use with children from two years of 
age. Further, we found evidence that, while the five-items did form an adequate Rasch scale, 
a four-item scale is more advisable for use with toddlers.  
 Evidence of the suitability of this test for use with younger children was confirmed 
through two key findings. First, from two years of age, children showed comprehension of 
the scenarios presented in the first three tasks. Second, from two years of age some children 
showed evidence of diverse-desires and diverse-belief understanding, showing the usefulness 
of the scale in discriminating between the early ToM abilities of toddlers.  
 Further to its usability as a single ToM test, we found clear evidence of convergent 
validity of the five-item scale against the single-index Sally-Anne task. The strength of the 
correlation between these measures shows that scale score did indeed provide a score that 
could indicate performance on an alternate, widely used ToM measure. However, the fact the 
association was not perfect demonstrated the scale also provided a novel measure of early 
ToM, beyond what can be captured by a false-belief task alone. The earlier (easier) tasks 
clearly provide a more extensive examination of ToM, prior to the development of false-
belief ability.  
Practical Applications and Future Direction 
 To date, the focus on false-belief ability has restricted our assessment, and thus 
understanding, of early ToM ability. The confirmation of the scale’s suitability with toddlers 
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opens an important window to more comprehensive examination of early ToM development. 
As the tasks were able to form a scale, they particularly demonstrate the strong potential of 
the use of this test as a longitudinal ToM measure. Wellman and colleagues (2011) have 
shown that patterns of responses evidenced in the scales cross-sectional data are replicated 
longitudinally with late pre-school and school-aged children. Results of the current study now 
pave the way for the longitudinal investigation of this test in a much younger age range (i.e., 
from two years old).  
Potential limitations of our study were the small and culturally homogeneous sample. 
As such, future research should focus on the use of this scale with larger samples, particularly 
of toddlers, as well as children from different cultures (as has been done with slightly older 
samples; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006). Moreover, it would be useful for future 
research to explore the scalability and validity of the American version of the five-item scale 
with this younger age range (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Given ToM’s link to social 
development, the future assessment of the test as a longitudinal assessment would also be 
highly beneficial in advancing our ability to early detect children who may be at-risk of 
developing social impairments. If we could identify what specific early ToM abilities (from 
the five-items) predicted later social difficulties it may open the window for identifying those 
children who may benefit from early social skills training, or even social support in the pre-
school and early-school setting.  
 
Summary 
 Our research answered some important outstanding questions regarding the use and 
psychometric properties of the five-item ToM scale. The test was deemed suitable for 
children from two years of age. While the test did meet requirements for a five-item Rasch 
scale, our results suggest (depending on the purpose of the test) that a four-item scale would 
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be more appropriate with two- and three-year old children, particularly given that few were 
able to comprehend the scenario presented in the most difficult task (Hidden Emotion) and no 
child under 46 months showed this more complex ToM ability. The good internal consistency 
and convergent validity of the scale point to the usefulness of viewing the tasks as a single 
test of ToM, providing researchers access to a validated ToM test, which provides 
information across six levels of ToM performance.  
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Table 1 
Number of Children Who Passed the Control Question and Focal Question Along With Age 
(in Months) at Which Questions Were Passed or Failed 
Task 
n passed 
(% of N) 
M Pass Age 
(SD) 
Youngest 
Pass 
Oldest 
Pass 
Youngest 
Fail 
Oldest 
Fail 
 Control (Preliminary) Question 
Diverse Desire 68 (100) 44.08 (11.26) 24.00 61.00 - - 
Diverse Belief 66 (96) 44.56 (11.08) 24.00 61.00 26.00 31.00 
Knowledge Access 44 (65) 49.32 (9.08) 27.00 61.00 24.00 53.00 
False-Belief 42 (61) 50.43 (7.89) 32.00 61.00 24.00 53.00 
Hidden Emotion 46 (68) 50.28 (7.37) 32.00 61.00 24.00 46.00 
Sally-Anne 60 (88) 44.77 (11.36) 24.00 61.00 26.00 55.00 
 Focal (Theory-of-mind) Question 
Diverse Desire 53 (78) 47.26 (9.86) 26.00 61.00 24.00 53.00 
Diverse Belief 39 (57) 47.85 (9.42) 27.00 60.00 24.00 61.00 
Knowledge Access 28 (41) 52.39 (6.36) 33.00 60.00 27.00 61.00 
False-Belief 11 (16) 53.09 (4.06) 45.00 60.00 32.00 61.00 
Hidden Emotion 9 (13) 55.56 (4.36) 46.00 60.00 32.00 61.00 
Sally-Anne 29 (42) 53.17 (6.01) 37.00 61.00 24.00 56.00 
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Table 2 
The Six Scalable Response Patterns and Descriptive Statistics for Responses Fitting Them 
Pattern 
Diverse 
Desires 
Diverse 
Beliefs 
Knowledge 
Access 
False 
Belief 
Hidden 
Emotion %(n) 
1 - - - - - 16 (11) 
2 + - - - - 13 (9) 
3 + + - - - 19 (13) 
4 + + + - - 16 (11) 
5 + + + + - 5 (3) 
6 + + + + + 3 (2) 
Other      28 (19) 
Note. + represents correct response, - represents incorrect response 
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Table 3 
Item and Person Measure Summary and Fit Statistics for Rasch Analysis of Five ToM Tasks 
Tasks and Person Measure Error Standardised infit Standardised outfit 
Item difficulty summary     
     Hidden Emotion  5.12  .29 .0 -.3 
     Content False Belief 5.00  .28 .1 -.3 
     Knowledge Access 3.61  .23 -1.3 -.3 
     Diverse Beliefs 2.61  .25 1.5 1.3 
     Diverse Desires 0.86  .38 -.2 -.5 
     M 3.44  .29 .0 .0 
     SD  1.59  .05 .9 .7 
Person ability summary     
     M 2.93  1.14 -.1 .0 
     SD 1.67 .29 1.1 .7 
Note. Expected values for standardised infit and outfit is M = 0 and SD = 1; a fit statistic  
> 2.0 indicates a misfit.  
 
